

# Individual Action and Collective Function: from Sociology to Multi-Agent Learning

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Co-learning of multiple agents has been studied in many different disciplines under various guises. For example, the issue has been tackled by distributed artificial intelligence, parallel and distributed computing, cognitive psychology, social psychology, game theory (and other areas of mathematical economics), sociology, anthropology, and many other related disciplines.

These studies are often disparate. Different disciplines tend to ignore each other, although there have been cross-disciplinary work, such as AI models and cognitive studies using game theory (e.g., West and Lebiere 2000), or sociological work incorporating psychological insights.

We believe that interdisciplinary interaction and integration are important, and cross-disciplinary communications can help to make better progress. Therefore, we want to take a close look at research on multi-agent learning, accentuating its interdisciplinary nature.

Many questions concerning multi-agent learning can be asked, in an interdisciplinary way:

- How do agents learn to cooperate with each others, especially under bounded rationality?
- What is the minimum cognitive capacity necessary for an agent to learn to cooperate with others?
- What are the realistic cognitive constraints in co-learning settings, and how do they help, or hamper, learning and cooperation?
- How do we characterize the process and the dynamics of co-learning, conceptually, mathematically, or computationally?
- How do social structures and relations interact with co-learning of multiple agents?

And so on.

A key question, however, is as follows, which deserves some discussion here. Adam Smith (1776) put it this way:

He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it..... He intends only his own gain, and he is led by *an invisible hand* to promote an end which was not part of his intention.

This paradox have been troubling sociologists and economists for many decades, and now computer scientists and psychologists as well. The issue may be formulated as the apparent gap between the individual intention in deciding his/her own action and the (possibly largely unintended) social function of his/her action. For example, how may self-interested action benefit social welfare? Or, how may cooperation be established through each individual maximizing his/her own gain (Axelrod 1984)? As Castelfranchi put it: “The real problem is modeling how we play our social roles, while being unaware of the functional effects of our actions, not only with our routine actions but even when doing something deliberately for our own subjective motives” (Castelfranchi, this volume).

Is this situation similar to the “paradox” of the firing of individual neurons and the computation of a network of neurons? Each neuron fires at its own “will” and apparently for its own “gain”. But, together, a network of neurons accomplishes complex functions unknown to individual neurons.

There is, clearly, a strong similarity there. However, when human actions are concerned, there is the issue of conscious intention of human actors, as well as explicit beliefs and goals of theirs (Sun 1999). Such explicit mental representation, which may not have any direct connections with social function, poses a serious theoretical dilemma, as pointed out, for example, by Elster (1982). The problem is how we bridge the gap between explicit individual intention and unintended social function.

As has been suggested before, the understanding of individual learning and collective evolution may be the key to a satisfactory explanation of this problem. Castelfranchi (this volume) looks into various forms of *emergence*, from simple pattern formation to cognitive emergence. Among them, cognitive emergence (or implicit-to-explicit bottom-up explication, as termed by Sun 1999 and Sun et al 2001) is important. Along with collective evolution, the notion of cognitive emergence may reconcile the afore-mentioned difference between individual intention and collective social function of human action. In a nutshell, the hypothesis is that collective social function may be lodged in the cognitive unconscious of the human mind, through long evolutionary processes in social environments, and through reinforcement agents receive on an individual basis. Such hidden motives, through the cognitive unconscious, may serve as Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”, giving rise to the emergent structures of social function. Then, through cognitive emergence (Sun et al 2001), they may become consciously known to agents as well, although correct conscious interpretations may not always be the case (as discussed by Castelfranchi, this volume).

Not only the notion of the individual cognitive unconscious need to be explored, the notion of the collective unconscious need to be explored as well (Sun 2001), in our attempt to answer some of the afore-identified open questions. For example, culture may largely consist of unarticulated (implicit, subconceptual) processes, in addition to articulated (explicit, conceptual) processes (Sun 2001). This perspective is similar to the Jungian notions of collective consciousness and collective unconsciousness (Jung 1959). Pierre Bourdieu (see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) also adopts such a metaphor and sees the “socio-analysis” as a collective counterpart to psycho-analysis: It helps to unearth the social unconscious embedded into social institutions and lodged inside individual minds. However, it should be noted that the social unconscious is an “emergent” property rather than existent in and by itself (Castelfranchi, this volume). The question is how we should understand and characterize the structures of the social unconscious and its “emergence”, computationally or otherwise. Answering this question

is a crucial step in establishing the micro-macro link, as highlighted earlier, between individual agents and society.

On the other hand, Burns and Gomolinska (this volume) address the social roles of agents involved in multi-agent interaction and learning. Based on the notion of rule complex (from knowledge representation in artificial intelligence), they describe how individuals change their beliefs (that is, how they learn) in the context, and through the filter, of social relationships, social roles, and social institutions they are involved in. Thus, multi-agent learning is not merely a matter of “straight” learning, but a matter of complex patterns of social interaction and cognitive processes, which leads to complex collective social function.

Beside broad theoretical issues, various technical aspects of (emergent) collective function of individual action need to be explored as well. Work on multi-agent learning in artificial intelligence is particularly pertinent, in that they provide useful tools, techniques, and concepts that can benefit the effort at a broad, multi-disciplinary understanding of individual action and collective function. In this volume, various aspects of multi-agent learning are addressed.

For example, Michael Littman (this volume) deals with value function reinforcement learning in certain types of multi-agent co-learning settings. His focus is on games (see von Neuman and Morgenstern 1944), especially games with competitive equilibria or with cooperative equilibria, which constitute a subset of possible game types. The basic approach is reinforcement learning, through estimating values of different actions. Several different types of reinforcement learning techniques that help to increase the likelihood of achieving Nash equilibria (i.e., stable and rational outcomes) are discussed. Formal results concerning their convergence are given. Such results are useful for advancing formal mathematical understanding of interaction among multiple agents in co-learning.

There are also models based loosely on economic (market) principles. For example, the work by Baum (1998) relies on an artificial economy for evolving an effective constellation of agents for accomplishing complex tasks. The work by Sun and Sessions (1999), on the other hand, focuses on a simple bidding mechanism for establishing multi-agent cooperation through reinforcement learning, in order to solve complex tasks efficiently.

Hu and Wellman (this volume) deal with on-line learning about other agents in double auction markets. Their interesting finding is that learning agents making minimum assumptions about other agents actually perform better than agents making more elaborate assumptions about their opponents (which may be wrong or otherwise misleading). It is an open question whether this conclusion is generally true of other circumstances as well, or it is more of a matter of case-by-case analysis. Some recent work suggests the latter (Sun and Qi 2000).

Cooperation in robotic teams has been the central theme of Maja Mataric’s research. In this volume, Mataric discusses a general approach: behavior-based representation, for individual robots as well as collections of robots. A variety of techniques are surveyed that range from the use of communication channels to ameliorate partial observability of environments, to the representation of behavior history as a way of coordination, and furthermore, to imitative learning by robots from humans and other robots. The on-going explorations of these techniques lead toward practical ways of constructing cooperative robotic teams that learn to coordinate and accomplish tasks jointly.

Overall, there are many issues, problems, and approaches concerning multi-agent cooperation. Among other things, learning (broadly defined) is essential for multi-agent cooperation, and worth much further exploration. Multi-disciplinary collaboration is, by all means, the most promising way of making rapid progress. In fact, centuries of theoretical work on sociology, anthropology, and economics has now been incorporated, in various ways, into work on multi-agent systems, including work on multi-agent learning, by many researchers. We are hopeful that this cross-disciplinary cooperation will lead to a better understanding of the sociology of collective function and individual action, as well as a

better understanding of human cognitive processes that underlie this process, which may in turn lead to better designs of artificial multi-agent systems. The present volume is a snapshot and a sampling of work in this direction.

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